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Previous studies have reported the effect of emotion regulation (ER) strategies on
both individual and social decision-making, however, the effect of regulation on socially
driven emotions independent of decisions is still unclear. In the present study, we
investigated the neural effects of using reappraisal to both up- and down-regulate socially
driven emotions. Participants played the Dictator Game (DG) in the role of recipient
while undergoing fMRI, and concurrently applied the strategies of either up-regulation
(reappraising the proposer’s intentions as more negative), down-regulation (reappraising
the proposer’s intentions as less negative), as well as a baseline “look” condition. Results
showed that regions responding to the implementation of reappraisal (effect of strategy,
that is, “regulating regions”) were the inferior and middle frontal gyrus, temporo parietal
junction and insula bilaterally. Importantly, the middle frontal gyrus activation correlated
with the frequency of regulatory strategies in daily life, with the insula activation correlating
with the perceived ability to reappraise the emotions elicited by the social situation.
Regions regulated by reappraisal (effect of regulation, that is, “regulated regions”) were
the striatum, the posterior cingulate and the insula, showing increased activation for
the up-regulation and reduced activation for down-regulation, both compared to the
baseline condition. When analyzing the separate effects of partners’ behavior, selfish
behavior produced an activation of the insula, not observed when subjects were treated
altruistically. Here we show for the first time that interpersonal ER strategies can strongly
affect neural responses when experiencing socially driven emotions. Clinical implications
of these findings are also discussed to understand how the way we interpret others’
intentions may affect the way we emotionally react.
Keywords: interpersonal emotion regulation, decision-making, social interactions, mentalizing
INTRODUCTION
Perspectives on affective neuroscience suggest that brain struc-
tures which generate emotional responses can be successfully
regulated by control regions when subjects are asked to apply
cognitive strategies to emotion eliciting stimuli such as unpleas-
ant pictures (Golkar et al., 2012; Ochsner et al., 2012). Emotion
regulation (ER) refers to a set of different strategies by which
“individuals influence which emotions they have, when they
have them, and how they experience and express these emo-
tions” (cf. Gross, 2007). Although mechanisms of basic emotion
self-regulation have been, at least in part, recently uncovered, sur-
prisingly little empirical work exists on an important topic: the
specific neurocognitive mechanisms behind interpersonal emo-
tion regulation (IER), a particular form of ER applied to socially
driven emotions.
ER can refer not only to people’s capacity to manage their
own emotions, but importantly can also extend to regulating
emotions that result from the interaction with others (Grecucci,
2012; Grecucci et al., 2013b). Previous studies have examined the
processes that individuals use to influence which emotions they
generate, when they do so, and how these emotions are expe-
rienced or expressed (Gross, 1998), and therefore we know that
different attentive, behavioral, emotional, or interpretative strate-
gies can be used also at an interpersonal level (Fonagy, 2006).
Of particular interest for the present paper are studies examining
the use of a strategy to regulate an existing or ongoing emotional
response, typically known as reappraisal. This strategy involves
reinterpreting the meaning of a stimulus to change one’s emo-
tional response to it (Gross, 1998). Subjects are usually asked in
this context to build an interpretation of the emotional stimulus
in such a way as to increase or decrease their emotional response
(respectively, up- and down-regulation), and behavioral studies
have shown that reappraisal is one of the most efficient strate-
gies for regulating negative emotional responses (Gross, 2002).
However, reappraisal applied to interpersonal contexts, that is,
focusing on the interpretations of others’intentions, is relatively
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neglected in the literature. Despite the existence of an extensive
literature on emotion “self-regulation,” focused primarily on the
regulation of basic emotions such as fear and disgust in relation
to visual stimuli (Ochsner and Gross, 2005, for a review), research
on regulation in social interactive situations (e.g., IER) is scant
(e.g., Koenigsberg et al., 2011; Grecucci et al., 2013a,b; Grecucci
and Sanfey, 2013).
Notably, processing socially cued emotions engages differen-
tial networks than does non-socially cued emotion (Britton et al.,
2006; Harris et al., 2007; Lestou et al., 2008), thus motivating fur-
ther exploration of the regulation of socially induced emotions.
The interest on such “social regulation” has been explored in a
recent study examining the ER of subjects while looking at pic-
tures depicting social vs. non-social scenes (Koenigsberg et al.,
2011). This study had subjects observing emotional vs. neutral
pictures while applying reappraisal strategies, but the novelty of
the study was in the usage of a subset of International Affective
Pictures depicting scenes with social features (e.g., people in situ-
ations of loss, abuse, aggression. . . ) instead of simple emotional
pictures. Interestingly, exposure to pictures depicting social situa-
tions activated brain areas partially involved in social cognition,
such as the superior and middle temporal gyri, in addition to
emotional and cognitive structures similar to previous non-social
studies.
However, though in this study people were asked to reappraise
emotions elicited by pictures depicting social scenarios, they were
not exposed to real social interactive situations. Studying the
neural systems involved in the regulation of actual interpersonal
situations is particularly important given the relevance of fail-
ure in regulating interpersonal responses in psychiatric disorders
(Phillips et al., 2003; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Grecucci, 2012;
Grecucci et al., 2013c). Moreover, in the aforementioned study
(Koenigsberg et al., 2011) a particular form of reappraisal was
used, namely “distancing,” a “self-focused” strategy in which
subjects view an emotional stimulus from the perspective of a
detached and distant observer (Koenigsberg et al., 2011; Ochsner
and Gross, 2013). This strategy may be reasonable when look-
ing at a picture but its use may be detrimental when interacting
with a real person. In contrast, in the present study we aimed
to use a reappraisal strategy focused on the “intention of oth-
ers,” which involves a reinterpretation of the meaning of the other
person’s mind, behavior and intentions. One advantage of the
latter strategy is that reinterpretation can be in both more or
less negative directions thus providing the opportunity to study
both up- and down-regulation effects, whereas distancing is only
intended to down-regulate one’s emotions. This is of notable
importance given that some clinical populations (e.g., paranoid
and borderline personality disorders, anxiety, schizophrenia, etc.)
are characterized by interpreting the intentions of others in a
malevolent way, thus causing inappropriate interpersonal and
emotional reactions (Grecucci et al., 2013c). Clinicians of dif-
ferent schools defined this process as “projective identification”
(Klein, 1946; Clarkin et al., 2006) or “hypermentalizing” (Allen
and Fonagy, 2006).
In a previous study we tried to fill this gap by employing
research paradigms designed to explore social economic deci-
sions, and we evaluated whether interactive emotion regulation
can occur through the mechanisms involved in self-regulation
of negative emotions. These studies (Grecucci et al., 2013a,b)
showed that an IER strategy of reappraising the intentions of the
other player as less negative, or mentalizing-reappraisal (a partic-
ular kind of “reappraisal”), is effective in changing both inter-
personal decisions (i.e., rejection rates of unfair offers in the
context of a socio-economic game) (Grecucci et al., 2013a), as
well-subjective responses to emotion themselves (Grecucci et al.,
2013b). The task used in one of these experiments (Grecucci
et al., 2013a) was the classic Ultimatum Game, where partici-
pants played the role of responder (Guth et al., 1982). The study
showed that subjects’ decisions were strongly modulated by the
reappraisal strategy used: less rejections of unfair offers when
down-regulating their emotions and more rejections when up-
regulating their emotions. The modulation was visible in an area
of the brain previously involved in the aversive reactions elicited
by unfair offers, namely the insula. The posterior part of the insula
showed a similar pattern of activation as was shown behaviorally
(less activity for down- and more for up-regulation as compared
to the neutral baseline). A limitation of that study was that the
task required subjects to respond to economic offers with the pos-
sibility of rejecting the bad proposals, thus leading to lesser gain
for the proposer him or herself. That is, subjects could punish
proposers for the bad behavior directed toward them, and indeed,
one of the primary emotions subjects reported when treated
unfairly was anger. Therefore, it could well be that the punish-
ment that subjects could inflict on proposers was itself a way to
show their feelings and thus modulate their own emotional states.
In other words, behavioral and neural responses showing mod-
ulation according to the reappraisal strategies could have been
more concerned with the decision than with the socially induced
emotions themselves. To further examine, at the neural level, how
purely socially induced emotions are regulated, the same subjects
played another socio-economic game called the Dictator Game
(DG) (Kahneman et al., 1986), once again as responders. In the
DG players must passively accept socioeconomic offers, usually
both fair and unfair, and therefore do not have the possibility to
punish the proposers’ unfair behavior and to potentially vent their
anger. Importantly, in this task we can focus more on the neural
activations, without the complication of having subjects involved
in both making a decision and providing a motor response. In
other words we have the unique opportunity to observe the neu-
ral effects of the regulation of socially elicited emotions without
the involvement of other decision processes.
In terms of the neural structures involved in ER, the liter-
ature on “self” regulation typically distinguishes regions that
implement the strategy (Regulating regions) and regions that
are modulated by the strategy (Regulated regions). According
to a recent model of the cognitive control of emotions (MCCE,
Ochsner et al., 2012), the regions involved in emotion generation
that can be regulated, are, in order of importance: the amygdala,
with less evidence for other regions such as the ventral striatum,
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (wmPFC), and the insula. At
the same time, other regions appear to act as control systems that
implement the regulatory strategy. These regions are primarily
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC)
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and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). However, we
do not know if this model can be applied to the context of IER.
Social emotions rely on different mechanisms and activate differ-
ent brain areas as do non-social emotions (Britton et al., 2006),
and therefore IER may be of a qualitatively different nature from
self-emotion regulation (Grecucci and Sanfey, 2013).
Thus, the first goal of the present study is to identify neu-
ral correlates and possible modulations of the regulation of
socially induced emotions stemming from interactive situations.
In particular we aim to uncover how dedicated brain areas
respond to the implementation of mentalizing-reappraisal strate-
gies (we define them: “Regulating regions”) when regulating
socially induced emotions such as those elicited by selfish and
altruistic behaviors during a DG. Given the particular interac-
tive task used in the present study, we expect that brain areas
more connected with building an interpretation of others’ minds
and intentions will be activated, specifically the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ). In recent years TPJ activation has been con-
nected to both social perception (Allison et al., 2000; Kourtzi
and Kanwisher, 2000) as well as to attributing intentions (Van
Overwalle, 2009) and mental states to others, namely theory of
mind (Frith and Frith, 2003). These results can extend a useful
model of ER (e.g., the MCCE) by adding social—interpersonal
mechanisms.
A second goal of the present study is to explore brain regions
that are modulated by these strategies (“Regulated regions”). We
expect social interactions to involve different neural structures
as compared to those of observing “scenes of humans inter-
acting in a negative way” (such as scenarios of aggression or
mourning). A recent study found that an emotional structure
involved when looking at social emotional pictures was the amyg-
dala (Koenigsberg et al., 2011), which is likely connected with the
unpleasantness of those scenarios themselves than to the inter-
personal reactions. In contrast, previous studies involving fair
and unfair socioeconomic behaviors have shown that the insula
may be responsible for negative reactions when treated unfairly
by another player in the Ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003),
and thus we expect that the insula will be active in the present
study when subjects are treated unfairly. We will test explicitly
for the emotions invoked by assessing affective reactions follow-
ing the game play. Based on the two previous goals we aim to
determine the neural circuitry underlying interpersonal regula-
tory processes. In line with previous studies we expect a network
of areas working together in order to produce successful regula-
tion of emotions elicited by social situations. This will be formally
tested in a dynamic causal modeling (DCM).
Strictly related with goal one and two, the third goal of the
study is to inquire what happens when we reappraise in a nega-
tive way the intentions of others. The vast majority of the previous
studies focused their attention on the effect of down regulating
one’s emotion. However, understanding what happens when we
up-regulate emotions is of critical importance. The up-regulation
of the emotion is commonly observed in psychiatric patients (in
the form of excessive emotional reactivity or inappropriate emo-
tionally laden behaviors), and it has been hypothesized to be
caused by failures in the way we interpret others’intentions (Allen
and Fonagy, 2006; Clarkin et al., 2006). The way we interpret
others’ mind, indeed affects the way we emotionally respond. This
is of undeniable relevance as it covers many clinical phenomena
associated with negative style of thinking and its effect on inter-
personal emotional reactions as visible in paranoid, borderline
patients and related disorders. The paradigm used in this experi-
ment gives us the opportunity to have subjects reappraising events
in a more or less negative way, thus providing the opportunity to
study both up- and down-regulation effects on the brain and on
emotional perception.
Finally, a fourth goal of this study is to detect both common
and different brain regions and subjective experience, associated
with the experience of being treated fairly, moderately unfairly or
very unfairly.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty-one participants (11 males, mean age: 23.5 ± 3.6 years)
participated in the study. Participants had normal or corrected
to normal vision and had no history of psychiatric, medical or
neurological illness, as verified by a semistructured interview by a
physician. All participants provided written informed consent, as
approved by the local ethical committee, and were paid 35 euros
for participation.
ASSESSMENT, TRAINING PROCEDURE, PARADIGM, AND FORMAL
DEBRIEFING
The experimental procedure comprised of four phases. A gen-
eral cognitive and emotional assessment (including the Emotion
Regulation Questionnaire, ERQ, Gross and John, 2003), followed
by training and testing in ER techniques. Then, subjects under-
went scanning with fMRI while playing rounds of the Ultimatum
Game and DG under conditions of ER in two separate runs inter-
mingled by a break. Finally, there was a formal debriefing phase.
Importantly, the sequence of the 4 phases was fixed having the
subjects performing first the training, than the UG, followed by
the DG and finally the debriefing. Participants were told they will
be playing with every partner twice in two different games (UG
andDG). They were also told that partners were real and that they
made two independent offers (one per game) recorded before
running the experiment. The two offers were randomly assigned
to every player in a way to avoid carry over effects of reputation
from one game to the other. In a previous paper we reported
results on Ultimatum Game (Grecucci et al., 2013a), therefore in
the present paper we concentrate on the results of the DG task.
In line with the previous formal operationalization of
mentalizing-reappraisal (see Grecucci et al., 2013b), participants
were asked in the training phase to reappraise the social situa-
tion following formal instructions. “When you are required to
“up-regulate” you should interpret the intentions and behavior
of your partner as more negative or potentially bad (instruc-
tion: “increase”); when you are required to “down-regulate” you
should interpret the intentions and behavior as less negative or
potentially good (instruction: “decrease”), when you are required
to “look” you should try to perceive the situation spontaneously
as it is without any effort to build any particular interpretation
of it.” They were given an example of a common negative sit-
uation and how it can be reinterpreted (reappraised) in such a
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way as to make it either more or less negative (See Grecucci et al.,
2013b). To ensure subjects understood the instructions and were
successfully applying the required reappraisal strategies, they were
asked to reappraise while viewing pictures from the IAPS pic-
ture set (Lang et al., 1997). Eighteen unpleasant IAPS pictures
were selected and divided into three subsets to be used across the
reappraisal conditions (up, down, and look). After a picture was
presented for 5 s, participants rated them according to valence and
arousal dimensions using the Self-Assessment Manikin procedure
(Lang, 1994). If the experimenter was satisfied by the reappraisal
strategies used, the participant was introduced to the last part of
the training, the DG. First, instructions were given on the DG
(see Figure 1A for a timeline). The task instructions emphasized
that the different partners in the game would play the game inde-
pendently of each other, and participants were led to believe the
games would be played for real with the set of partners they saw.
After the basic DG instructions, subjects were given instruc-
tions on how to apply reappraisal to DG. In the DG-training
phase, each participant played three practice rounds of the DG as
responders, twice in which they were asked to reappraise (accord-
ing to the strategies indicated), and once in which they played
without any reappraisal instruction (baseline condition). The
instructions given on how to apply reappraisal strategies were
as follows: “It is very important that you now try to apply the
reappraising strategies learned in the IAPS-training to the situ-
ations evoked by the DG. In particular, you should try to come
up with possible interpretations of the intentions and behaviors
of the proposer in a way to make it more (up regulation) or
less negative (down regulation). For example, when instructed to
“increase” youmay think the player is a selfish person (intentions)
and wants to keep all the money (behavior). Whereas, when you
have to “decrease,” you may think that the player has financial
problems and is giving you the best offer they can.” In the “look”
condition they were asked to read and emotionally respond to
the offer in the most natural and spontaneous way. Participants
were debriefed following these three practice trials and asked to
report their strategies for each trial. After the training, partici-
pants entered the scanner and played a block of 20 rounds for
each of the three regulation conditions counterbalanced across
participants, for a total of 60 rounds as recipients, with each trial
proposal involving a division of C10.
The set of offers received by each participant was pre-assigned.
The set of 20 offers comprised of 7 fair offers (C5 to each player)
and 13 unfair offers, defined as offering the participant less than
half of the money. The unfair set was composed of 7 very unfair
offers of C1, and of 6 mid-range values (2 offers of C2, 2 offers
of C3 and 2 offers of C4). Half of the offers were made by a
male partner, and half by a female partner. The order of part-
ners and the pictures associated with each offer was completely
randomized. Participants first saw a picture of the proposer on
that round, followed by the offer of that player. After the offer was
made, participants applied the reappraisal strategy required. To
encourage participants to pay attention to the task it was empha-
sized that they would be paid according to the other players choice
in the game (even though for local ethical reasons they were paid
the same), and to make them responsive, they were required to
press a button to advance to the next trial. In a post scan session
participants were exposed to two samples of rounds (specifically
FIGURE 1 | (A) A timeline of the events for each trial. (B)
Emotion regulation training results before the Dictator Game
ensured that subjects were able to apply the strategies. (C)
Emotion ratings clarified the emotions primarily evoked by the
task. (D) Subjects reported their emotions changing according to
both strategies.
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on involving the fair 5:5 offer and one involving the unfair 1:9
offer) used during the scanning session and asked to evaluate
the strength of emotions elicited (anger, sadness, disgust, sur-
prise, and happiness) on a 9-point Likert scale. After each of these
rounds they were also asked to indicate whether they felt their
emotions were modulated according to the strategy when asked
to apply up- and down-regulation on each of these sample trials.
SCANNING PROCEDURE
Whole brain distortion-corrected EPI with 32 axial slices (3-mm-
thick, 1-mm gap) were collected at 4T (Bruker MedSpec MRI)
with a T2∗-sensitive gradient echo spiral pulse sequence (TR of
2.2 s, TE 33ms, 75◦ flip angle, 64 × 64 data acquisition matrix).
T2-weighted spin-echo scans were acquired for anatomical local-
ization using the same slice prescription. Stimulus presentation
and data acquisition were controlled using E-prime software.
Responses were made with the index and middle fingers of the
right hand using two buttons on a four button MRI-compatible
response box.
fMRI DATA PRE-PROCESSING AND GENERAL LINEAR MODEL
ANALYSIS
Functional images were slice time corrected andmotion corrected
using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
London). For all participants, we acquired 738 volumes (246
each fMRI-run); the first 3 volumes were discarded for each
run. In preprocessing of the data, the EPI volumes were spa-
tially realigned to correct for movement artifacts (Ashburner
and Friston, 2003) and motion corrected by distortions inter-
actions (Andersson et al., 2001), and smoothed using 9-mm
Gaussian kernel to account for residual intersubject differences
(Worsley and Friston, 1995). For statistical analysis, we used
the general linear model implemented in SPM8 as an event-
related design and we modeled the onset of each category and
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function
(HRF, event duration = 0), then we estimated the effect size for
each participant for each of the relevant 9 conditions (fair offers
down-regulate, fair offers look, fair offers up-regulate, mid offers
down-regulate, mid offers look, mid offers up-regulate, unfair
offers down-regulate, unfair offers look, unfair offer up-regulate)
using the general linear model. Because our main question con-
cerned the regulation of the behavior of the partners in the
DG, activation onsets were aligned with the display of the pro-
posed monetary offer on each trial. Finally, the first-level analyses
included also the parameters of the realignment (motion correc-
tion) as covariates of no interest. Next, we obtained 9 contrast
images per participants, corresponding to the 9 conditions of
interest. Statistical threshold were set to p-corr. = 0.05 corrected
for multiple comparisons at the cluster level (cluster size esti-
mated at p-unc. = 0.001), considering the whole brain as the
volume of interest. Furthermore, region-of-interest (ROI) anal-
yses were also carried out with the aim to provide additional
information confirming the statistically valid inferences based
on main effects and simple main effects off the random effects
analysis. Each ROI consisted of a sphere of 8mm of diameter
centered around the peak of activation using Marsbar toolbox
(Brett et al., 2002).
DCM AND BAYESIANMODEL SELECTION
DCM (Friston et al., 2003) was used to explore experimentally
induced modulations (Stephan et al., 2007) in key regions of
interest to better understand the effects uncovered in the general
linear model analyses. DCM models can shed light on how the
neural dynamics are shaped by experimentally controlled manip-
ulation. With DCMwe aimed to test which regions were involved
in the effect of ER of social interactive situations. To ensure com-
patibility, the choice of subject-specific coordinates was guided
by group maxima as derived by the GLM analyses, and adapted
to each individual by adjusting for closest maxima. Regional time
series of each subject was extracted as the first eigenvariate of all
activated voxels within a 8mm radius around the maxima. BMS
was based on the same GLMmodel of the RFX analyses described
above.
RESULTS
RATINGS RESULTS
We first examined if the affective ratings when reappraising IAPS
pictures were different across conditions in the training phase
(also see Grecucci et al., 2013a). To calculate the ability to reap-
praise the stimuli, we calculated the fluctuations of both arousal
and valence over the baseline “look” condition (see Figure 1B).
We ran paired sample t-tests, with participants’ subjective ratings
separately for both arousal and valence as dependent variables.
Both comparisons were all significant, indicating that participants
appeared to have learned reappraisal abilities—Valence: down vs.
up [t(19) = 549, p < 0.001]; Arousal: down vs. up [t(19) = −419,
p < 0.001]. Subjects rated their arousal as increasing in the up-
regulation and decreasing in the down-regulation, while valence
was decreased in the down-regulation (meaning it was less nega-
tive), and increased in the up-regulation (more negative).
To understandwhich were the emotions thatmight be involved
when reappraising the social situation of DG, and to check for
confidence when applying the strategies, we analyzed the debrief-
ing questionnaires. Notably, this debriefing exposed subjects to
the same kind of stimuli taken from the scanning session, but,
added questions to understand (1) the emotions involved, (2)
the level of emotional strength and (3) the perceived ability to
reappraise. One participant was excluded due to non-completion
of the ratings. First, we performed an ANOVA with factors
being Fairness (C1 vs. C5) and Type of emotion (anger, sad-
ness, disgust, surprise, happiness). This returned a significant
main effect of Fairness [F(1, 19) = 15, 000, p < 0.001], of Type
of emotion [F(4, 76) = 7466, p < 0.0001], as well as the inter-
action [F(4, 76) = 39, 920, p < 0.0001]. Then dependent-sample
t-tests were performed using subjective ratings for every couple
of emotions per time as dependent variables. Results demonstrate
that the level of anger significantly differed from most of other
emotions [anger-disgust: t(19) = 2058, p < 0.05; anger-surprise
t(19) = 2868, p < 0.01; anger-happiness: t(19) = 6064, p < 0.001;
anger-sadness: t(19) = 296, p < 0.05]; disgust differed from hap-
piness [t(19) = 4807, p < 0.001] but not from surprise [t(19) =
1539, p = 0.14], and from sadness [t(19) = 847, p = 0.408]; sur-
prise differed from happiness [t(19) = 4578, p < 0.001], but not
from sadness [t(19) = −607, p = 0.55]; happiness differed from
sadness [t(19) = −4188, p < 0.001]. However, when correcting
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for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni, p = 0.005) anger did not
differ anymore from disgust and from sadness, and surprise did
not differ from happiness. Overall, these results indicate that the
emotion elicited by the unfair offers in a post scan session iden-
tical to the one used in the scanning session, and presumably
modulated by the reappraisal strategies when subjects reappraised
the DG rounds, was anger followed by sadness and disgust
(see Figure 1C). Finally, in a manipulation check, participants
were asked to indicate whether they felt their emotions changed
according to the strategy adopted (see Figure 1D). Results were
computed as deviations from the mean (5 point in a scale from
1 to 9) using dependent-sample t-test with subjective ratings for
each of two offers as dependent variables. Participant ratings indi-
cate that in the “Down” condition, both fair (5:5) and unfair
(1:9) offers were modulated in the predicted direction [respec-
tively, t(1, 20) = −2416, p < 0.05 and t(1, 20) = −3141, p < 0.05],
while in the “Up” condition only the unfair offer was modulated
in the expected direction [t(1, 20) = 2234, p < 0.05; t(1, 20) = 576,
p > 0.05 for the fair offer]. Please note that these results were also
partially presented in a previous study (Grecucci et al., 2013a).
fMRI RESULTS
Main effect of strategy
To begin with, the main effect of regulation strategy (down +
up > look across all trial types) was computed to explore the
brain structures involved when applying the strategy reappraisal-
mentalizing to the social situation of the DG as compared to the
baseline condition of merely observing the offers. This analysis
showed activations of, in order of significance, the left middle
frontal gyrus, a swathe of temporo-parietal regions bilaterally, the
insula bilaterally and the left inferior frontal gyrus. (see Figure 2
and Table 1). In addition, the IFG positively correlated with
ERQ measures and insula was positively correlated with the per-
ceived change in emotional response as an effect of up-regulating
and negatively when down-regulating (p < 0.05), supporting the
insula’s role in IER.
Separate effects of up- and down-regulation strategies
In order to test for differences between the two regulatory
strategies, we separately computed the effects of up- and
down-regulation. These contrasts were each computed by com-
paring to the baseline look condition. Down-regulation strategy
involved significant activation of the TPJ bilaterally, the left mid-
dle and right superior temporal gyrus and the left inferior frontal
gyrus (Table 2A), whereas, the up-regulation strategy revealed the
right middle temporal gyrus, the left insula, the right superior
temporal gyrus, the left striatum, the left inferior frontal gyrus
and the left inferior parietal gyrus (Table 2B). In other words, the
way we interpret others’ intention (mentalize), affect the activity
of brain regions associated with unpleasant emotional reactiv-
ity (insula), and with the perception of others (semantic areas in
temporal regions).
Regulation effects
Similarly to results of a previous study (Grecucci et al., 2013a),
where some activations were reduced when down-regulating and
others increased when up-regulating, we expected the effects of
the applied strategies to produce varied effects across key brain
FIGURE 2 | The main effect of strategy returned significant activations
for MFG, IFG, and temporo-parietal activations. Overall these regions
responded more to up- and down-regulation conditions as compared to look,
independent of offers. Of these regions the IFG activity correlated with ERQ,
and the Insula with the perceived change in emotion as an effect of strategy
in the debriefing questionnaire.
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Table 1 | Effect of strategy (all offers UP + DOWN > LOOK).
Anatomical
label
Voxel H Z p MNI
x y z
STG* 1119 L 6.01 0.000 −54 −31 4*
STG*ˆ 685 R 5.52 0.000 54 −61 31
MFG 108 L 5.10 0.000 −39 44 7*
TP 50 L 5.09 0.000 −57 8 −11
Insula 83 L 4.98 0.000 −45 11 10*
TP 44 R 4.69 0.000 57 11 −11
IFG 32 L 4.52 0.000 −57 11 19*
Insula 18 R 4.08 0.000 45 11 −11*
SFG 17 L 4.21 0.000 −36 14 49
ˆinc. TPJ sites, *p = 0.05 FEW.
Table 2A | DOWN regulation (DOWN > LOOK for unfair + midfair).
Anatomical
label
Voxel H Z p MNI
x y z
TPJ 445 R 4.70 0.000 63 −61 16*
TPJ 485 L 4.64 0.000 −66 −46 4*
pMTG 66 L 4.16 0.000 −57 5 −14
aSTG 49 R 4.13 0.000 54 5 −11
IFG 16 L 3.64 0.000 −48 5 13*
Table 2B | UP regulation (UP > LOOK for unfair + midfair).
Anatomical
label
Voxel H Z p MNI
x y z
pMTG* 548 R 5.34 0.000 45 −40 −5
*TPJ 1078 L 5.27 0.000 −48 −43 22*
*Insula 682 L 4.84 0.000 −39 8 −2*
aSTG 169 R 4.78 0.000 54 8 −11
Striatum 46 L 4.39 0.000 −21 8 4*
IFG (9) 39 R 4.22 0.000 −60 11 22*
IPL (40) 147 L 4.21 0.000 −45 −43 52
MFG (10) 39 R 3.84 0.000 33 56 4
*p = 0.05 FWE.
regions. To test for this hypothesis we computed the contrast
down< look< up. The regions modulated by the strategies were,
in order of significance, the striatum bilaterally, the posterior cin-
gulate cortex and the insula. Of particular interest for the present
paper are the insula for its well-known role in socioeconomic
games, the striatum, often modulated in reward experiments
(Staudinger et al., 2009), and the posterior cingulate cortex.
To better understand the activity patterns of these three
regions, we extracted the signal from the voxels from a sphere of
8mm around the peak of activity using Marsbar toolbox (Brett
et al., 2002). As shown in the bar plots, the insula, the cingulate
and the striatum were clearly modulated by the strategies, each
showing down < look < up behavior (See Figure 3, Table 3).
Notably, insula activity was correlated with the level of anger
experienced by subjects when receiving a very unfair offer (p <
0.05), thus confirming the hypothesis derived from clinical obser-
vations that if we perceive in a negative way the intentions of
others this will affect our interpersonal emotions and reactions.
Interaction of strategy with different types of social behaviors
To examine how the regulation strategies were applied across
different types of social behavior observed by the subjects (fair,
moderately unfair, very unfair), we computed three separate con-
trasts for each set of behaviors when regulating the associated
emotions (up and down vs. baseline for each of fair, moderately
fair and very unfair behaviors). This set of analyses demon-
strated several areas commonly activated independent of offer
type, but, also some differences. This result was further confirmed
when computing conjunction and disjunction analyses for the
three contrasts (see Figure 3, as well as Table 4). A conjunction
analysis returned the common areas active for all the three types
of behaviors, and a disjunction analysis was computed by collaps-
ing between unfair and mid fair (previously exploratory analyses
had shown that they were very similar), and contrasting them to
the fair condition with exclusive contrast. These analyses returned
common areas: the inferior frontal gyrus, the middle temporal
and parietal cortices, together with the occipital gyrus (Figure 4,
on the bottom left), and also specific areas: the middle frontal
gyrus, the TPJ, the insula, and loci on the temporal cortex were
only active duringmoderately fair and very unfair offers (Figure 3
on the bottom right), confirming and extending previous results
on this topic (Sanfey et al., 2003; Grecucci et al., 2013a).
DYNAMIC CAUSAL MODELING
Following the contrast results presented above and based on the
previous literature on this topic, we assume that when subjects
reappraise their emotions, some regions in the brain are responsi-
ble for the implementation of the reappraisal strategy that is they
act as “Regulating regions” and some other regions responsible
for the emotional appraisal becomes regulated, in other words
they can be considered as the “Regulated regions.” Building on
this observation we aimed at discovering which region is modu-
lated by the regulating regions that may subserve the regulation
of interpersonal emotions. This was done by testing three dif-
ferent models (DCMs) that keep constant the regulating regions
(more active regions in the “effect of strategy” contrast, IFG and
TPJ), while varying the regulated region (striatum, insula, poste-
rior cingulate). We assume that the model that shows the stronger
connection parameter between the regulating regions and the
regulated regions is the model that better explain the regulatory
effects observed in this experiment.
To begin with, we used the same GLM design used for all
the contrasts in this paper. Inputs were modeled with the same
design matrix of the GLM used in the main analyses. There were
three regressors for strategy (down, look, up) multiplied by three
regressors for level of fairness (fair, mid fair, unfair), with a total
of nine regressors. The contrasts that entered the DCM were the
effect of strategy and the effect of regulation (see previous para-
graphs), for both unfair and mid fair offers that showed a similar
result in previous analyses. Then we selected the meaningful
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FIGURE 3 | Regions modulated by reappraisal-mentalizing (down\look\up), returned regions showing a linear increase: the striatum, the posterior
cingulate and the insula. Notably, insular activity in this contrast positively correlated with the level of anger when treated selfishly (debriefing).
Table 3 | Effect of regulation DOWN < LOOK < UP for unfair and mid
fair.
Anatomical
label
Voxel H Z p MNI
x y z
Striatum 388 L 4.08 0.000 −15 5 −19*
p.Cingulate 97 R 3.96 0.000 21 −40 25*
MiFG 16 L 3.84 0.000 −42 −1 46
VMPFC 17 − 3.81 0.000 0 65 1*
paraHippG 43 R 3.61 0.000 42 −37 −2
Striatum 64 R 3.60 0.000 21 5 −2
MeFG 124 L 3.45 0.000 −3 5 58
Insula 30 L 3.20 0.001 −42 11 −2
regions to put in the models to test. We extracted time series
from spheric volume of interests (VOI) of 8mm from these five
regions using the coordinates derived from theTables 1, 3, though
adjusted for local maxima.We included the two key regions found
in the main effect of strategy (down + up > look contrast),
namely the IFG (−54, 8, 22) and the TPJ (−54, −46, 28),
that reasonably are the structures implementing the reappraisal
process and act as modulators. Whereas, from the regulation con-
trast, the striatum (−21, 14, −17), the posterior cingulate (27,
−46, 37) and the insula (−39, 5, 1) were found to be the regions
regulated (down < look < up contrast). Previous exploratory
analyses reported similar results for separate IFG and TPJ so
we assume they are acting in a similar or in concert and thus,
we computed three separated DCMs as follow: (1) Regulating
regions: IFG + TPJ, Regulated: Striatum, (2) Regulating regions:
IFG + TPJ, Regulated: insula, (3) Regulating regions: IFG + TPJ,
Regulated: posterior cingulate, in order to test the idea of which
region is modulated by IFG and TPJ. Moreover, we tried differ-
ent combinations of connections (feedforward and backforward),
tested for both up and down regulation conditions. However,
results derived from different types of connectivity and for both
regulations, led to similar results. For the matter of simplicity, we
reported only results derived from the up-regulation for unfair
and mid fair offers, and feedforward connections (hierarchically
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Table 4A | Interaction effects (conjunction of all offers).
Anatomical
label
Voxel H Z p MNI
x y z
OG 107 R 4.92 0.000 24 −94 −2
IFG 200 L 4.38 0.000 −45 11 10
OG 188 L 4.28 0.000 −33 −88 −14
MTG 94 L 4.26 0.000 −57 −37 −2
MTG 51 R 3.84 0.000 48 −31 −2
Table 4B | Interaction effects (disjunction between unfair +mid vs.
fair offers).
Anatomical
label
Voxel H Z p MNI
x y z
MFG 391 L 5.76 0.000 −42 −1 46
TPJ 157 L 5.65 0.000 −60 −46 13
Insula 207 L 5.10 0.000 −48 −1 13
MTG 57 L 5.01 0.000 −54 −22 −2
FIGURE 4 | To understand how different types of behavior affect brain
responses, separate analyses were computed for the three levels of
offer shown (very unfair, moderately fair, fair). Disjunction analyses
clarified that insula and other regions differentiated selfish from altruistic
behavior.
organized from IFG and TPJ to each of the three target regions)
analyses. The three models were estimated with a Bayesian model
comparison. Results reported in Figure 5, show clearly a pref-
erence for model 2 (Regulating regions: IFG + TPJ, Regulated
region: insula).
DISCUSSION
In the present study we show the neural correlates of IER, that
is, regulatory strategies applied to socially evoked emotions. As
detailed below, this study extends previous studies on this topic,
exploring for the first time whether cognitive regulation strate-
gies modulate brain responses of social emotions (e.g., affective
response to being treated well or poorly by another). Previous
findings on the neural substrates of cognitive reappraisal were
FIGURE 5 | Dynamic causal models. In squares the “Regulating regions”
and in circles the “Regulated regions.” Three models were tested. Results
showed that a model considering the IFG and TPJ acting as modulators and
the insula as the regulated regions is the one that better explains the data.
replicated, while also extended to uncover brain structures more
generally involved in both mentalizing and interpreting other’s
intentions in a more or less negative way.
BRAIN CORRELATES OF INTERPERSONAL EMOTION REGULATION
During the acquisition of reappraisal strategies subjects were
capable of successfully modulating their perception of the valence
and arousal levels of training stimuli. Unpleasant pictures taken
from the IAPS database were rated as more arousing and more
negative in the up-regulation condition as compared to baseline,
and conversely less arousing and less negative in the down-
regulation, again compared with the baseline condition. Further
assessment of strategy application revealed significant modula-
tion of the ability to down- and up-regulate on command. This
allowed us to address four primary questions here. Firstly, we
sought to confirm previous studies on ER that have outlined a
role for inferior frontal gyrus in implementing reappraisal strate-
gies (see Wager et al., 2009; Ochsner et al., 2012, for reviews). We
confirmed this point, showing clear activation of the IFG when
asking which brain regions were generally responsible for reap-
praising the intentions of others. This finding further extends the
role of this region in reappraising, by demonstrating its involve-
ment in interpreting another emotional state, this time anger
when treated unfairly in a social interactive context. This region
has also been observed in a previous study about socioeconomic
decision-making using a different task (see Grecucci et al., 2013a).
Using for the first time a social interactive task independent
of a decision-making situation allows for exploration in more
detail of brain regions associated with different kinds of behav-
ior. This manipulation showed strong involvement of social and
mentalizing related regions. The temporo-parietal areas, as well as
the medial prefrontal cortex including the paracingulate cortex,
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have been implicated in mentalizing (Frith et al., 1991; Frith
and Frith, 2003) and intention-detection, and may be particu-
larly important here when considering that reappraisal strategies
specifically lead participants to reinterpret the intentions of their
opponents, as assessed by self-report measurements taken after
scanning. Making sense of social interactions requires inferring
intentions, beliefs, and desires, that is attributing mental states
(i.e., mentalizing; see Frith et al., 1991). This was exactly what
players were doing when applying the reappraisal strategies, and
other recent studies have pointed out that mentalizing abilities
are involved when making socially valued decisions (Evans et al.,
2011). In sum, this study can extend actual model of ER such as
the MCCE of Ochsner et al. (2012), suggesting that TPJ should be
included in the list of regions acting as modulators, in addition to
the previously cited dlPFC, ACC, vlPFC, and dmPFC.
Another goal of the present experiment was to study brain
responses when facing different kinds of social behaviors from
another, from a fair interaction based on equity to increasingly
unfair scenarios based on inequity and selfishness. Insula was
found to be the key region in differentiating the selfishness of
another’s social behavior.
MENTALIZING INTERPERSONAL EMOTIONS
Another finding of this paper was the detection of areas poten-
tially responsible for appraising and reappraising social emotions.
The regions implicated here were the striatum, the posterior cin-
gulate cortex and the insula. Interestingly, the striatum has been
involved not only in primary or secondary rewards, but also to
more abstract, social rewards (van den Bos et al., 2013). One
hypothesis is that when subjects engage in social interactions such
as the one induced by the DG, the associated social reward value
is changed according to the success of this interaction. Therefore,
the regulation strategies may affect this region’s response in such a
way as to adjust the social value when treated unfairly, depending
on the reappraisal strategy used. Importantly, when mentalizing
in a negative way, activity in the striatum is increased. This mech-
anism may serve to evaluate and “label” the unfair partner and
adjust future interactions with the same partner. Indeed, it was
recently proposed that striatum plays a role in reputation forma-
tion, another aspect of regulating our reactions when interacting
with others (Engelmann and Hein, 2013).
Another region, modulated by the strategy was the posterior
cingulate. This is in accordance with previous findings on perceiv-
ing negative emotions, especially anger (Murphy et al., 2003), and
on regulating emotions induced by simple visual stimuli (Ochsner
et al., 2004a,b; Goldin et al., 2008), thus extending the role of these
areas into regulating more complex socio-economic emotions.
Last but not least, the insula has been previously reported in
the context of the UG, and shown to be involved in responses
to unfair offers in particular (Sanfey et al., 2003), and also when
modulating the associated decision to reject them (Grecucci
et al., 2013a). Consistent with previous studies (Pillutla and
Murnighan, 1996; Xiao and Houser, 2005), post-scanning
debriefing indicated that anger was the primary emotion elicited
by a selfish interactions. Interestingly, neural evidence of the
involvement of the insula in the emotion of anger has recently
been shown (Denson and Nandy, 2009). One difference with
the previous study mentioned above is that in Grecucci et al.
(2013a) two regions of the insula where found to be active, one
more anterior and one more posterior. In the present study only
the anterior insula was modulated by the strategies. Activation
of bilateral anterior insula to unfair behavior when interacting
with a partner is particularly interesting in light of this region’s
association with negative emotional states (Sanfey et al., 2003).
This region has also been implicated in studies of emotion, in
particular involvement in the evaluation and representation of
specific negative emotional states (Calder et al., 2001). With
respect to emotion-processing systems, it has been hypothesized
that reappraisal would modulate the processes involved in eval-
uating a stimulus as affectively significant (Goldin et al., 2008).
Reappraisal effectively down-regulates emotion related neural
responses that together modulate ongoing emotion experience
in emotion-appraisal brain systems, including the amygdala,
subgenual ACC, ventromedial PFC, and insula (Ochsner et al.,
2004a,b; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Eippert et al., 2007; Grecucci
et al., 2013a). If the activation in the anterior insula is a reflection
of the responders’ negative emotional response to an unfair offer,
we might expect activity in this region to correlate with the degree
to which subjects apply the reappraisal strategies, which is indeed
what was found. The better subjects are at down-regulating their
emotions, the less the insula is active, whereas, the better subjects
are at up-regulating their emotions the more this regions is
active. The role of this region in reappraising social emotions was
also confirmed by further tests using DCM as a way to explore the
network implied in effective regulation. These analyses showed
that a circuit including IFG and TPJ acting as modulatory
structures and the insula as the region modulated, is responsible
for the regulation of socially induced emotions. One hypothesis is
that the insula represents the mean by which cognitive strategies
can modulate the arousal associated with emotions (Grecucci
et al., 2013a). Indeed, other regions found to be modulated by
the strategies in the GLM analysis (cingulate cortex and striatum)
were not found to be modulated by IFG and TPJ when con-
sidering DCM. It is typically assumed that the beneficial effects
of reappraisal are accomplished via interactions between PFC
regions and subcortical networks related to emotional respond-
ing (Beauregard et al., 2001; Ochsner et al., 2004a,b; Kalisch et al.,
2005; Phan et al., 2005; Urry et al., 2006; Eippert et al., 2007;
Kim and Hamann, 2007; van Reekum et al., 2007; Goldin et al.,
2008; Wager et al., 2009). In particular, Wager and collaborators
showed with pathway-mapping analysis that a circuit including
the ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex (close to the IFG of the
present study) and target emotional regions (nucleus accumbens
and amygdala) are responsible for regulation strategies.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
The present study has also relevance for understanding some
clinical phenomena such as paranoid thinking and interpersonal
skills deficits. Psychotherapists as well as psychiatrists, know that
the way we interpret the intentions of others can deeply affect
emotional reactions (Allen and Fonagy, 2006; Clarkin et al.,
2006), and interpersonal behavior (Linehan, 1993). The more we
perceive the intentions of others as malevolent, the more negative
emotions we feel, and the more we respond to others in a bad
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way. In the present study we studied what happens when subjects
mentalize in a negative way the intentions of others (up regulation
condition). We found that this thinking strategy (implemented in
the IFG and TPJ) increases activity in brain structures responsi-
ble for emotional reactions (such as the insula and the striatum),
and areas associated with the perception of others’ mind (mid-
dle and superior temporal gyrus?). Notably, when mentalizing in
a negative way, insula’s activity correlates with the level of anger
when treated selfishly. Overall, these data confirm clinical pre-
vious observations stating that interpreting others’ intentions in
a negative way, increases inappropriate interpersonal emotional
reactions by affecting the perception of others.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Lastly, we acknowledge some of the limitations that character-
ize the present study. First, the lack of internal emotional rating
during the scanner limits the connection of the neural results
with the corresponding subjective level. However, it should be
pointed out that there is supporting evidence that the manipu-
lation was affecting the subjective-behavioral level, as the same
subjects also played the Ultimatum Game in which we showed
strong behavioral modulation of subjects’ decisions when apply-
ing the strategies (see Grecucci et al., 2013a). Future studies will
have to assess at a more behavioral-subjective level the effect
of reappraisal strategies in regulating social emotions (Grecucci
et al., 2013b). Moreover, in the present study we did not include a
measure to assess the quality of interpersonal transaction, though
a previous study used the percentage of rejection rates of the
partners’ proposals (Grecucci et al., 2013a). Future studies may
include subjective or behavioral indexes in order to have a quanti-
tative measure of this. Last but not least, the DCM results should
be considered as exploratory and more complex models may be
addressed in future research.
CONCLUSION
Previous studies have reported the effect of ER strategies in the
self, however, the effect of regulation on socially driven emotions
was still unclear. Here we show for the first time that IER strategies
can strongly affect neural responses when experiencing socially
driven emotions, thus extending actual models of ER.
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